Abstract
Introduction
Critical information services such as online stock information systems and medical records databases are increasingly becoming accessible through the Internet.
Such applications give rise to significant security and reliability problems. From the viewpoint of a system user, there are at least two fundamental requirements: privacy protection and assurance of service availability. While attempting to meet these requirements, a system has to cope with software bugs, operator mistakes, and malicious attacks -the common causes of service interruption [6].
Protecting the privacy of a user is concerned with a method for protecting rhe idenriry of the information the user is interested in (i.e. the inrenrion) against any attacks occurring on the information system side. For example, when querying an online stock information system, an investor is usually reluctant to reveal the specific stock of interest to any other parties including the operators who manage the system. This problem is traditionally called Private Information Retrieval (PIR).
C h w et al [7] identified the PIR problem in 1995 and
proposed several PIR schemes. Their schemes used a socalled honest-but-curious model in which an attacker may observe the transactions performed between a user and the information system (so as to find out the intention of the user) but nor act maliciously. Most research in this field [I, 3, 4, 7 , 8, 14, 151 has used the same assumption for potential attacks.
A PIR scheme may require a set of replicated servers (RS) or use only a single server (SS). In the RS-based approach [ I , 3, 7 , E], identical database servers are replicated on separate nodes of a distributed system. It is assumed that communication between the replicated servers is limited so that the servers cannot collude together in trying to violate the user's privacy [7] . It follows that, given unlimited resources, any individual server cannot gain any information of the user's intention.
In the SS-based approach, no replication of servers is needed but the computational capability of servers must be bounded. For example, the work reported in [4, 14, 151 assumes the difficulty of breaking some numbertheoretical problems (e.g. the existence of one-way functions). As long as these problems are still hard to solve in a computational sense, the user's privacy is preserved.
The existing PIR solutions do not tolerate any type of server faults. The honest-but-curious model they used is unrealistic. In practice, an attacker may actually spy on transactions occurring between a user and a system, stop running the servers, lamper with the information stored in the servers, and maliciously manipulate results returned to the user, A more realistic fault mcdel is urgently needed. The previous PIR work has also focussed on demonstrating the theoretical possibility of PIR without any practical implementation and experimentation attempted. The binary bit string model used by the existing work is tm restricted to be utilised in real systems.
I n this paper we introduce a fault-tolerant approach to secure information retrieval that guarantees both users' privacy and service availability even in the presence of malicious server faults. We present the design and implemenration details of a fault-tolerant PIR scheme. Our work also demonstrates the practical feasibility of applying both PIR and FT-PIR to a realistic database system and provides significant experimental results and performance analysis.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the system model and gives an overview of FT-PIR. Section 3 presents the formal description of Fl-PIR and discusses a verification function for detecting corrupted results. Section 4 gives the design and implementation details of a PIR scheme and the Fl-PIR scheme. Section 5 presents experiments and performance analysis, and Section 6 discusses the related work briefly. Section 7 concludes the paper.
System Model
Consider a synchronous distributed system with a set of processing nodes connected by a communication network. It is assumed that any message passing amongst the nodes is bounded within a given period of time. The system contains a set of k replicated servers (called replicas) [S,, S2, ..., SkJ and a set of clients, running on separated processing nodes. The replicas provide information services to the clients and the clients take inputs from the users of the system. A replica can simultaneously deal with multiple clients' queries, while a client may need to send queries to multiple replicas to utilise a service.
A replica stores information using a database or a file system. The information is identical for a11 replicas and is modelled as a character string x = xI xi ,., x, of length n .
Each character xj. where j E I 1, 2, ..., n ) . is an integer taken fromagiven integerset[X-I]= (0. I, ..., X-l).For example, if we encode characters using the ASCII code, an eight-bit byte character can be viewed as an integer taken from the set (0, I, ..., 255). In fact the range of this set can be adjusted dynamically according to the actual data status.
In order to perform certain operations on x E [X-I]", we associate the set [X-l J with a finite field CF (9). where 9 is a prime number and 9 2 X. Let 19-11 = IO, I, 2, .... q-I ) be the set of 9 elements of GF (9). We have
c [q-I] ". Note that the results of operations over a finite field, e.g. addition, multiplication, subtraction, and division, are still elements of the finite field [161. Protection of Privacy: We now explain briefly the principle of private information retrieval. Suppose that a user is interested in the character x, stored in a system. Within the system, a client lakes i as the input from the user, where i E 1 1, 2, ..., n ) . In order to keep this user's intention private from any replica, the client constructs k quenfunctions Q I , ..., Qk, based on i and some random inputs and generates a set of random and thereby independent queries. These queries will then be sent to the replicas respectively.
There are k answer Junctions A , , . . ., Ar that are defined for the replicas respectively and perform read-only operations on x. Based on the query submitted from the client, each replica executes its answer function to generate an answer and sends the answer back to the client. The client will then reconstruct x, locally by executing a reconstruction Junction. Finally, the correct value ofx, will be passed to the user.
Fault Model: In this paper we take server faults into account only. The replicated servers in a system can be malicious and behave arbitrarily. The information stored, queries and answers may be corrupted. A server may return a spurious answer, or collude with other malicious servers to violate users' privacy.
Fault Tolerance: In order to tolerate malicious server faults, redundant but different queries have to be generated by the client. Based on a threshold number of correct answers from those fault-free replicas, the client will be able to reconstruct a correct result. To reduce the number of redundant queries needed, a verification function may be used to validate the result.
Our system model differs from the PIR model developed in [7] in several ways. First, the mcdel in 171 uses a binan bit string to model the information that is hard to implement in practice. Our character string model is much more realistic and has been implemented in an actual setting. Secondly, we add the fault tolerance capability to PIR by a combined use of redundancy and result verification. Thirdly, our model assumes malicious servers while the model in [7] says that servers may be curious but always honest.
An FT-PIR Scheme
Consider k replicated servers. Let t be the maximum number of faulty replicas, r be a random input to the query functions, and L, be the length of the random input. Ly is the length of a query, Le, is the length of an answer, and sI. ... 
where the probabilities Pr's are taken over uniformly c) Safety: The scheme will output only the intended d) Liveness: The scheme eventually terminates.
Property a) states that there exists at least onc set of replicas (i.e. availability) whose answers can be used to reconstruct the intended result (i.e. correctness). Property b) means that from any set of I queries, it is impossible to decide which specific data item the user is interested in since the joint distribution of Qsl(i, r ) , is independent of i. In other words, from t or less queries it is theoretically impossible for a replica or a group of replicas to gain any information about i . Property c) is guaranteed by the verification function. Property d) holds provided that k 2 21 + I.
Construction of an FT-PIR Scheme
and randomly chosen r E [q-IIb.
resultx, E [X-I].

r )
A PIR scheme was developed in [7] using the method of low degree polynomial interpolation [2] . An FTPIR scheme can be constructed based on the PIR scheme, with additional queries. For every; E [ I , 2, ..., n ) . we define a function j : [ n ] H (0, I ) . so that for every I = I , 2, ..., n, j(1) = I, if 1 = j , otherwise j ( l ) = 0. Each query function consists of n degrcc-t polynomials: The client needs to select k non-zero distinct points mk and then sends from GF(q), denoted by m,. m2, _.., the tuple <gl(m,f), g2(mr), ..., g,,(mJ> as a query to replica S,, for d = 1, 2, _.., k .
Each answer function will be in the form:
By the constructions, we know that
S,, will send the value of F.
most I.
(m,,) back to the client. From k replicas, the client will obtain the values of the polynomial F ( z ) at 21 + I distinct points. Based on any I + I value pairs, the client will be able to use the Lagrange Interpolation formula to reconstruct a result. Without loss of generality, assume that the f + 1 value pairs are reconstruction function F .' (z) can be defined as follows.
Probabilistic Result Verification
It is important to notice that the condition k 2 2t + 1 implies only the existence of a correct result. In order to identify the correct result as the system output, we have to either design a perfect verification function or introduce further redundancy into queries. Both solutions are costly. Probabilistic result verification is desirable in this case since it keeps additional redundancy at an acceptable level.
The polynomial interpolation-based PIR schemes and our Fl-PIR scheme essentially share the same spirit uf Shamir's secret sharing scheme [IS] . All these schemes exploit the polynomial properties (i.e. perfect secrecy and interpolation uniqueness [ 121) for providing privacy protection and fault-tolerant operations. It is therefore possible to apply the existing results of secret sharing lo both PIR and FT-PIR schemes. In the following, we develop a probabilistic verification function for FT-PIR, based on Tompa and Woll's modification 1191 on the Shamir's secret sharing scheme. This function does not guarantee perfect result verification but detects corrupted results with a high (and adjustable) probability.
The main idea of the probabilistic verification function is to limit the valid range of reconstructed results.
Because a character xi 0 E (I, 2, __.. n ) ) is an integer taken from a pre-known set [X-I], for every xi. there are exactly X candidates of valid results. Note that all calculations and functions are performed over the finite field GF(q). There will be 9 possible reconstructed results for xJ over the set [y-I] . It follows immediately that if a reconstructed result is within [X-I], it is valid. Otherwise, it is invalid.
Recall that [X-I] c_ 19-11. We can increase the size of GF(q) such that most of corrupted results will appear in the set [q-I] -[X-I]. In other words, the probability of undetected errors can be confined within a pre-defined bound e for any e > 0. Although it is possible that a valid result in [X-I] is in fact a corrupted result (i.e. not the intended result), the probability that this actually happens can be controlled by adjusting the field size intentionally.
According to [19] , for a (t. k) Fl-PIR scheme, if 9 > max[(X -I)(de) + f + I , k ] , the probability of undetected errors will be less than the arbilrarily small e (for the proof, readers are referred to [19] ). This ensures that 9 is large enough to reveal the corrupted results with a high probability (1-e). e.g. 99.99%. Further discussion about how to decide the 9 in our implemented system will be detailed in Section 4 and 5 .
This verification function does not rely on any unproven cryptographic premise (e.g. intractability of factorisation of big primes) and on the availability tamper-proof hardware (e.g. secure processors). The probabilistic assurance is guaranteed unconditionally provided that the 9 is determined by the above formula.
A Control Algorithm for FT-PIR
We will describe a control algorithm that we used to implement the FTPIR scheme. It is assumed that a RESULT value is valid if and only if RESULT E [X-I]. The control algorithm first initialises the RESULT to be -I (a dummy value and viewed as an impossible result). The algorithm accepts only a valid RESULT and rejects any invalid results. The groupcounter variable counts the number of candidate result groups checked so far.
RESULT= -I.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
I O A user feeds an index i to the system. Use the query functions to generate k queries.
Wait until at least f + 1 answers available.
Set groupcounter to 1;
stop.
(In this case, there must be more than f faulty servers and the scheme will not be able to reconstruct the result.)
Select a new group off + 1 candidate answers.
Based on the answers in the group, execute the reconstruction function to get a RESULT. Perform the verification function: if the RESULT is valid, go to step IO. Otherwise, increment groupcounter and go to step 6.
Output the RESULT to the user and stop.
We can now prove that the FT-PIR scheme with probabilistic result verification satisfies the properties specified in Section 2, provided that k 2 2f + 1. Q. E.D. The scheme will only satisfy the safety property with a pre-defined probability, but guarantee the liveness property.
Implementation
This section describes implementations of three information retrieval schemes: a normal scheme called NIR, the polynomial interpolation PIR scheme described in 171, and our FT-PIR scheme. The NIR scheme retrieves database records by sending SQL queries in a normal way. For NIR there is no protection for users' privacy and no fault tolerance. Thc PIR scheme protects users' privacy only against honest-hut-curious servers, while the FT-PIR scheme guarantees both users' privacy and service availability. An identical system architecture, depicted in Figure I , was used for all implementations to ensure a fair comparison basis.
The communication between the client and replicated servers are implemented using Java sockets. The input from the user will be the index of specific record in the server database and the result will be the actual database record. The cld is a multithreaded client daemon. It interfaces with user-level applications and performs the following tasks: taking inputs from the user and returning results to it. The cld spawns k client threads cldt,, cldt,, ..., cldt, to handle communications with servers concurrently. There are four major modules program for all the implementatims. The module init ( 1 takes parameters from a configuration file to initialise the system. In the current implementation, this file resembles the queries based on the user's input. The prepareQuery 1) module prepares the queries. The sendQuery ( ) module creates k client threads and starts to run them immediately. After finishing the sendQuery0 module, k client threads will communicate with k servers concurrently. The performeconstruction ( I module, waits until there is sufficient number of answers available for the reconstruction operation. For the NIR scheme, there is no need to perform "reconstruction" since the results will be an actual record.
CtiRZt RCUtirnS Figure 1 . T h e system architecture.
In the MR implementation, the configuration file contains only the information for the index of data item interested: IndexOfDataItemIntersted. A normal SQL statement will be generated by the sendQuery I module. The performReconstruction0 module outputs the records returned from servers as the final result. For PIR, the configuration file contains two pieces of extra information:
RandomSeed and
MaximumNumberOfHonestButCuriousReplicas.
The prepareQuery ( ) module does a job similar to PIR, but the calculations will take longer time due to the increased order of finite fields. The perfoweconstruction 0 module performs the reconstruction function. Instead of waiting for all answers to return, i t only has to wait for a sufficient number (i.e. I + I ) of answers hack from replicas to start the reconstruction process.
On the server side, the server daemon red is also a multithreaded program, concurrently dealing with multiple queries from clients. For clarity, we did not illustrate the multithread feature of red in Figure 1 . The k replica daemons are denoted by red,, where i = I, 2, ... , k. When red, gets a client's query, it spawns a replica thread redt to deal with the query according to the answer function. In the current implementation. each server thread connects to a back-end database via the Java's JDBC driver.
For PIR and FT-PIR implantations. two types of messages needed to be passed between clients and servers: handshake messages and protocol messages. At the handshake stage, a client thread sends a message in the form of <handshake, nameOfDatabase> to the server daemon. Each replica thread will reply with a handshake message <handshake, 1engthOfDatabase. lengthOfRecord>. The client thread will then start to send queries to servers. Finally, two key modules DBTransformation() and ca1-m 1) will be executed by the PIR and FTPIR server threads. The former pre-processes the entire database and transforms it to an integer array. The latter uses the integer array and the query to produce an answer in the form of a string. Since these implementations do not modify any records and schemas stored in the replicated databases, we believe that the implementations described in this section are applicable to other realistic database or file systems.
Experiments and Analysis
This section describes the experiments and analysis based on our previous implementations. We will examine the performance overheads imposed by both PIR and FI-PIR, especially their relative performance in a fault-free setting as well as in a faulty environment.
Experimental Environment
The computers used in our experiments were connected via a IOMBlsec Ethernet LAN. The network delay, measured using the ping command, is always less than or equal to IOms. The client machine is a SUN SPARC workstation running Solaris 8.0. All the server machines have the same specifications: 400 MHz Pentium 11s (celeron) running RedHat Linux (6.0 or 7.2). 3Com EtherLink XL lOMb Ethernet NIC (3C900B-COMBO). For PIR, all the computations were performed over the finite field GF(257). For FT-PIR, the range of data (RangeOfData) was set to be 255 since all the possible characters are of the form of ASCII code. The value of UndetectedErrorRate was Set to beO.03, meaning that the verification function detects an invalid result with a probability 97%. The order of finite field can be adjusted intentionally. For example, when k = 3 (thus tolerating one server fault), the field is set to GF(8501). When k = I I , the field is fixed to CF(42349).
The garbage collection feature of Java often causes performance instability. To overcome this problem, all the performance data presented below are averages of more than 100 runs.
Experiments
We are mainly interested the average lime taken to get a result for the user. As described in the following equation, thc total processing time (T€'T) consists of TPQ (time taken to prepare a query), TSQ (time taken to send a query), TWRG (time taken to wait for a ready answer group), and TR (time taken to reconstruct a result).
We also are interested in the maximum time used for dealing with all the queries sent to the replicas, denoted by TDQmax. Since the client daemon interacts with replicas concurrently, TDQmax reflects the actual speed of replicas.
A. Cornparkon between PIR and FT-PIR in a Fault-Free Environment
We performed an initial performance comparison between NlR and various PIR schemes in 1211. The results showed that both PIR and FT-PIR generally double the execution cost of NIR. We now investigate the extra cost introduced by the FT-PIR scheme against the PIR scheme. This extra cost comes from the extra time used to compute over a bigger finite field, to generate more queries, to deal with more concurrent threads. and to verify results.
To start the reconstruction process, PIR needs all the f + I answers returned, while FT-PIR only needs to wait for the first group off + I answers from the k = 2f + I servers returned. Therefore, FT-PIR will automatically use the answers from fast machines and ignore the slow machines.
The average of TPT for PIR is about 307ms and the standard deviation is always within 6%. As shown in Figure 2 , the TF7 of PIR did not increase as the number of replicas increased. This is because P I R s TR increased very slowly, as shown in Figure 3 . It is worth to note that when k = 3 and 9, the TFT of PIR is longer than the others. This is possibly due to the fact that the actual Figure 6 shows the maximum time taken to deal with queries. Throughout all the experiments, TDQmax of FT-PIR was observed to be always shorter than TDQmax of PIR, meaning that FT-PIR is always faster than PIR to get a ready group in fault-free cases. Fork = 3, IT-PIR spent 3 5 6 less time than PIR in terms of the maximum time taken to deal with queries. This is simply because FT-PIR always selects the fast replicas and ignores the slow ones, while PIR has to wait for all the replicas to reply. TDQmax is quite stable for both schemes because I ) the machines have same specifications and 2) the client communicates with replicas concurrently. The standard deviation ofTDQmax is always within 3 6 in both cases. Figure 7 shows the average time to wait for a ready group. In PIR, the standard deviation of TWRG is always within 6%. However, TWRG of IT-PIR drops dramatically as the number of replicas increases. Between three and eleven replicas, the TWRG decreases 40.94%.
B. Performance of FT-PIR in Faulty Cases
This section describes our effort in investigating the performance of FT-PIR in a faulty environment. The fault in this section is limited to fail-stop faults -replicas just stop serving any queries and deliver no response. Although IT-PIR can tolerate malicious faults, we will not discuss here the performance implication of malicious attacks. This is because simulating the behaviour of malicious attackers is a difficult task and requires a number of deliberate treatments. The related experiments will constitute the core of our further investigation.
In our experiments, replicas listen to a specific port (e.g. 5000) for incoming queries from clients. When simulating a faulty replica, we simply change this predefined port to another one (say 6000) in the clientside program. Since no programs run on port 6000, the client thread will report a failure of the specific replica. Since the maximum number of faulty replicas classifies the tests performed, there are only five categories of tests in total. We also rotated the replicas in turn to simulate faults in the hope that each replica has the same probability to fail. Table 2 shows the performance of IT-PIR when experiencing fail-stop faults. As expected, TPQ and TSQ increase as the number of replicas increases. But the total of TPQ and TSQ is always less than 4% of TPT.
TDQmax is stable for all the experiments. The standard deviation of TDQmax is identical for PIR and Fl-PIR.
Again, TR becomes the major contributor to TPT as the number of replicas increases.
For each category (for example, k9t4 -f4, k9r4 -p.
k914 -0, and B14 -fl, where f is the number of actual faulty replicas), TPT does not increase as f increased. The standard deviation of TPT in the above example is within 2%. This is because TWRG and TR did not change much for the same number off. TWRG and TR are the major factors in deciding TPT for FTPIR. Figure 8 shows that TWRG in faulty cases is generally less than that in the fault-free case. In fact, we only need to check less group combinations. However, as discussed before, this is also related to the speed of replicas. As expected, in Figure 9 TR is nearly the same for both cases since given same pieces of answers it should take the same time to reconstruct a result. Faults have no impact on TR in general. Figure I O is a combination of the patterns shown in Figure 8 and 9. Initially. TWRG is the major factor in TPT. As the number of replicas increases, TR becomes a major contributor to TPT.
An important observation is that FT-PIR performs even better in the faulty cases than in the normal cases. In particular, when k = 3 (i.e. I = I), 35.82% less TFT is observed. When k = 1 I (i.e. 1 = 3, on average, it is only 2.75% extra time spent in the faulty cases. However, this saving decreases with an increase of k because TR (the reconstruction and verification time) becomes the maior 
Related Work
There are a number of research areas related to our work I ) PIR, 2) combination of Fault Tolerance and Security, and 3) protection of software execution in an untrusted environment. As discussed in Scction I, the PIR schemes are theory-focussed and based on the honest-butcurious model. There are several proposals that use some form of "encrypted data shares to achieve better security and reliability of systems. [22] are other examples that address both security and fault tolerance issues of servers in asynchronous distributed systems. However, all the above proposals and systems have traditionally focussed on protecting critical information on the server side rather than the privacy of the system users.
Our work may be loosely categorised as a combination of fault tolerance and security, but with an emphasis on the protection of users' privacy from a variety of faults and guarantee the service availability for users. Unlike the above examples, our new scheme does not require vast message passing for the purpose of coordinating operations between nodes, and not rely on any unproven cryptographic premises to detect corrupted results.
Existing approaches for protecting software in an untrusted environment generally have only a limited capability to guarantee the data privacy and to tolerate malicious faults. In [2O], Wang et al. proposed to use software transformation to protect software. It is expected that after transformation, an attacker may find difficult to understand the program. However, this approach could not tolerate any data tampering type attacks.
Conclusions and Future Work
Previous PIR research mainly demonstrated the theoretical feasibility of PIR schemes based on a simple model of binary bit strings. All the theoretical work assumed the honest-but-curious model without addressing malicious attacks. Our work shows that it is possible to enhance PIR with an ability to detect and tolerate malicious faults. A probabilistic algorithm for error detection is derived and embedded into an FT-PlR scheme. It can detect the occurrence of corrupted results, and thereby reject them with a high probability. We have also demonstrated the practical feasibility of our approach by designing and implementing the FT-PIR scheme in a real distributed database environment. The comprehensive performance analysis shows that the general performance of lT-PIR is highly acceptable and comparable with typical PIR schemes. In many cases, FT-PIR performs even better than PIR.
There are at least four possible extensions to this work in the future. First, we plan to investigate the relationship amongst different factors (e.g. the size of a database) of the system performance. Secondly, we will explore the scalability of the system by varying the number of concurrent clients. Thirdly, it would be interesting to develop schemes that protect both users' privacy and servers' privacy together in the presence of malicious faults. Finally, we plan to extend our initial work by 
